North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1

Article 7

10-1-1971

Analysis of Cases Arising under the Public
Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act and
Decided by the United States Supreme Court Since
1960
Joseph L. Askew

Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Social Welfare Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Askew, Joseph L. (1971) "Analysis of Cases Arising under the Public Assistance Titles of the Social Security Act and Decided by the
United States Supreme Court Since 1960," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol3/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact
jbeeker@nccu.edu.

Askew: Analysis of Cases Arising under the Public Assistance Titles of t

COMMENTS
Analysis of Cases Arising Under the Public Assistance Titles of the
Social Security Act and Decided by the United States Supreme Court
Since 1960
INTRODUCTION

The public assistance titles of the Social Security Act formed the
framework for state programs that provide welfare on a "categorical"
basis to certain eligible persons. They are essentially the following four
titles: Title I, Old Age Assistance (OAA) ; Title IV, Grants to States
for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children (ADC or
AFDC); Title XIV, Grants to States for Aid to the Permanently and
Totally Disabled (APTD or AD); Title X, Aid to the Blind (AB).'
Statistics evidence that these four categories as well as those which
receive general assistance have mushroomed into monstrous millions
and billions. In mid-1960 there were 3 million AFDC recipients. Today there are more than 9 million. And costs have skyrocketed from
621 million dollars in 1955 to 4.1 billion dollars in 1970. Old age recipients increased from 1.6 billion in 1955 to 1.9 billion in 1970; blind
recipients' benefits increased from 69 million dollars in 1955 to 97 million
dollars in 1970; disabled recipients' benefits increased from 147 million
dollars in 1955 to 897 million dollars in 1970; and those who received
general assistance were increased from 287 million dollars in 1955 to
602 million dollars in 1970.2
The big controversy in Congress and among the public is focused on
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. However, there has been an
abundance of cases that were heard and decided by the United States
Supreme Court since 1960 regarding general assistance and the other
three categories.
The purpose of this article is to give an analysis of cases arising
under the Public Assistance titles of the Social Security Act that have
been decided by the United States Supreme Court since 1960. The following topics will be discussed: (1) Maximum Grants, (2) Limitations
on State Resources, (3) Dependent Child, (4) Computing Aid for the
1015, 2021.
'Public Welfare, Poverty Law Reporter
"Welfare Out of Control," 80 U.S. News & World Reports 32 (Feb'-,
ruary 8, 1971).
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Dependent Child, (5) Eligibility, (6) Congress and Welfare Recipients,
(7) Equal Protection and Statutory Claims, (8) Substituted Father,
(9) Man-in-the-House, (10) State and Federal Funds, (11) Liens
and Assignments, (12) States with Repayment Provisions, (13) Discriminatory Statutes and Relief, and (14) Termination before Hearings.
In the analysis and discussion, several dominant issues will appear.
They are as follows: (1) Whether the state regulation is inconsistent
with the Social Security Act? (2) Whether the state regulation is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States? (3) Whether a federal court that
is called upon to pass on the constitutional validity of a state welfare program should, before reaching the constitutional issues, consider first
any pending statutory claim? (4) Is a state agency in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it does not afford
a welfare recipient an evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits?
(5) Does a state agency have a right to terminate a recipient of AFDC
from receiving benefits if the recipient does not consent to the official
entering his home?
MAXIMUM

GRANTS

State regulations concerning maximum grants have long been one
of the disputed issues in our courts. Often in an attempt to exercise the
concept, many welfare systems would compute the standard of need for
each eligible family based on the number of children in a family and
the circumstances under which the family will live. In general, the
standards of need increased with each additional person in the household, but the increase became proportionally smaller. Single families
could receive up to a limit of a certain number of dollars per month in
certain counties. Elsewhere, the limit would be even less as opposed to
a neighboring county.
One of the most popular decisions regarding maximum grants is
Dandridge v. Williams.3 The plaintiff had a large family. He brought
suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging
that the Maryland maximum grant regulations were in conflict with the
federal Social Security Act and with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court was chosen which
held the regulation violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
'397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. It
held that the maximum grant regulation was not inconsistent with the
Social Security Act and was not violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.4
LIMITATIONS

ON STATE RESOURCES

42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 (1964 Ed., Supp. IV), shows that Congress was
itself cognizant of the limitations on state resources from the very outset
of the federal welfare program. The first section of the Act reads as
follows:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their
own home or in the homes of relatives by enabling each state to furnish
financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy (dependent)
children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help
maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives
to attain or retain capability for maximum self-support and personal
independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection ... (Emphasis added)
From the reading of this section of the Act, it is recognized that
federal law gives each state great latitude in dispensing its available funds.
In the Amendments of 1967, Congress acknowledged a full awareness of state maximum grant limitations by adding to Section 402 (a)
supra a subsection 23:
The State shall provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the
State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to
reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established,
and any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid to
families will be proportionally adjusted. 81 Stat. 898, 42 U.S.C. Section
602(a) (23) (1964 Ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added)
Congress left the structure of specific maximums to states and the
validity of any such structure must meet constitutional tests. However,
the above amendment does make clear that Congress fully recognized
that the Act permits maximum grant regulations. Dandridge v. Williams, supra.
'Montgomery v. Kaiser, 397 U.S. 595 (1970). For a discussion on jurisdiction,
see Black, J., joined by Berger, J., concurring opinion. Also, note that probable
jurisdiction was noted on direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253; Dandridge v. Williams, 396 U.S. 811 (1970).
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DEPENDENT

CHILD

42 U.S.C. Sec. 606(a) (1964 Ed., Supp. IV) defines "dependent
child" as it appears in this case. It means a needy child:
(1) Who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the death, continued absence from the home or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with father,
mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew,
or niece in a place of residence maintained by one or more of
such relatives at his or their own home and
(2) Who is:
(a) Under the age of 18, or
(b) Under the age of 21 and (as determined by the state in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare) a student regularly attending a school, college, or a university or regularly attending
a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit
him for gainful employment.
Generally, the argument is that the state regulation denies benefits to
the younger children in a large family. Thus, the regulation is in patent
violation of the Act since those younger children are just as dependent
as their elder siblings under the definition of "dependent child" fixed
by federal law.' Another famous argument that has been entertained by
the court is that the regulation, limiting the amount of money any single
household may receive, contravenes a basic purpose of the federal law
by encouraging the parents of large families to farm out their children
to relatives whose grants are not yet subject to the maximum limitation.
The courts are more likely to accept the better and more realistic view
that the lot of an entire family is diminished because of the presence of
additional children without any increase in payments.' Also, the court
is likely to accept the view that the family grant is only affected by
additional births.
COMPUTING AID FOR THE DEPENDENT

CHILD

In the instant case, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, the district court
noted, the amount of aid "is . . . computed by treating the relatives,
parents or parent, as the case may be, or the (dependent child) as a
5

King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
0Id.
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part of the family unit."7 Congress has been so desirous of keeping dependent children within a family that in the Social Security Amendments
of 1967 it provided that aid could go to children whose need arose
merely from their parents' unemployment under federally determined
standards, although the parent was not incapacitated. In addition, it
was stated that the states must respond to this federal statutory concern for preserving children in a family environment.'
ELIGIBILITY

There is considerable support in the legislative history that "eligibility
or eligible individuals" means eligible applicants for AFDC grants,
rather than all the family members whom the applicants may represent,
and that the statutory provision was designed only to prevent the use
of waiting lists.9 This is also the view that has been taken by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare who is charged with the
administration of the Social Security Act and the approval of state
welfare plans. There has been much argument about Section 402 (a) (10)
of the Social Security Act regarding the term "eligible individuals."
The majority of arguments seem to follow this trend, that the maximum
grant system is contrary to 42 U.S.C.A. Section 402(a) (10) of the
Social Security Act, as amended, which requires that a state plan shall
"provide .... that all individuals wishing to make application for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children shall have opportunity to do so
and that Aid to Families with Dependent Children shall be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals."
(Note that this argument generally does not stand, see Dandridge v.
Williams, supra.)
In Rosado v. Wyman,"0 the court dealt with facts similar to those of
Dandridge v. Williams, supra. In addition, it introduced a new term
"special grants" and rendered an opposite decision. New York, by
Section 131-A of the Social Service Law, altered its standards of need
computation under the federally supported Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs, and adopted a system fixing
maximum allowances per family based on the number of persons in
"Dandridge v. Williams, 297 F. Supp. at 455.
'42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. IV, 1964).
' See H.R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 48, 148 (1949); 95 Cong. Rec.
13934 (1949), Remarks by Rep. Forand.
10 397 U.S. 397 (1970).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1971

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 7
80

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

the family and the age of the oldest child, and eliminated a "special grants
program."
The court held that (1) after the equal protection issue became
moot, the district court properly exercised its pendent jurisdiction over
the issue involving Section 402(a) (23); (2) because the plaintiffs were
not seeking review of an administration order and could not have obtained an administrative ruling from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, since the department had no procedures whereby
recipients could participate in the department's review of state welfare
programs. Neither the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies nor the primary jurisdiction had any application to the case, and
there was no basis for the refusal of the district court to adjudicate the
merits of the plaintiff's claims; (3) the New York statute, by eliminating special needs grants, impermissibly lowered the state's standard
of need in violation of Section 402(a) (23) ; and (4) the plaintiffs were
entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, but New York was entitled to an opportunity to revise its program in accordance with the
requirements of Section 402(a) (23) if it wished to do so.
THE POWER OF CONGRESS AND REVIEW BY WELFARE RECIPIENTS

Congress has not foreclosed judicial review to welfare recipients who
are most directly affected by the administration of the program, and
it is the duty of the federal courts to resolve disputes as to whether federal
funds allocated to the states for welfare programs are properly expanded.
As Justice Cardozo stated, speaking for the court in Helvering v. Davis:
"When [federal] money is spent to promote the general welfare, the
concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the
state.""
EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATUTORY CLAIMS

Wyman v. Rothstein,"2 398 U.S. 275 (1970), involved an action
that was brought in the federal district court challenging equal protection on statutory grounds, § 131 (a) of the New York Social Security
Law. It was brought by the aged, blind and disabled recipients. The
New York Social Security Law provided for payments to welfare recipients in Nassau, Suffolk, and thirty other New York counties in
lesser amounts than provided for residents of New York City. A three11301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).

12398 U.S. 275 (1970).
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judge court warranted and issued a preliminary injunction against the
payment of welfare in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court found it unnecessary to
consider the appellees' statutory claims (probable jurisdiction was
sought). It was the opinion of the three judge court that the District
Court should have considered the appellees' statutory claims.
Judgment by the district court was vacated and the case was remanded
for an opportunity to pass under priority of granting interim relief in
accordance with conventional equitable principles or on the basis of
appellees' statutory claims. It is interesting to note that subsequent
to the decision of the district court in this case, the same court rendered
its decision in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, holding that a federal court
called upon to pass upon the constitutional validity of a state welfare
program should, before reaching the constitutional issue, consider first
any statutory claims that are presented, notwithstanding the pendency of
negotiations between the state and the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.'"
THE SUBSTITUTED

FATHER

King v. Smith, supra, deals with the term known as the "substitute father." In this case, Alabama had a regulation which denied
AFDC payments to children of a mother who "cohabitated or cohabitates
in or outside her home with any single or married man." A three-judge
district court granted the plaintiff declaratory and injunctive relief,
finding the regulation to be inconsistent with the Social Security Act
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the holdings that: (1) a threejudge district court was properly convened and (2) the Alabama regulation was invalid because it conflicted with the AFDC provisions of
the Social Security Act and federal policy both insofar as it was based
on the state's asserted interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior
and illegitimacy, and insofar as it defined the term "father" as including a person who did not owe to the child a state-imposed legal
14
duty to support. Pendent jurisdiction was noted.
Also, similar to the opinion in the above case, is Lewis v. Martin15
8
Lampton v. Bonin, 397 U.S. 663 (1970).
"For further information on jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4).
For similar holdings, see Solomon v. Shapiro, 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
15397 U.S. 552 (1970).
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which deals with the man-in-the-house rule. Here, the court held that
the Health, Education, and Welfare regulation was valid and that in
essence approved the actual contribution. California could not consider
a child's resources to include either the income of a non-adoptive natural
parent, or the income of a man assuming the role of spouse, whatever
the nature of his obligation to support. Justices Black and Berger in
their dissenting opinion stated that since the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare had primary jurisdiction over the issues involved, and the administrative procedures provided by the Social Security
Act had not been exhausted the district court did not have jurisdiction
over the case.
It is not reasonable to infer that a man assuming the role of the
spouse will contribute to the support of the mother and her needy
child.1" This case is extremely important because it spells out that
Congress has specifically delegated to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare the authority to implement the particular aspects
of how "other income and resources" are to be considered under 42
U.S.C. Sec. 602(a) (7).
Two

BASIC FACTORS IN

DETERMINING AID TO FAMILIES

WITH DEPENDENT

CHILDREN BENEFITS

There are two basic factors that enter into the determination of what
AFDC benefits will be paid. First, it is necessary to establish a "standard of need," a yardstick for measuring who is eligible for public
assistance. Second, there must be decided how much assistance will
be given, that is, what "level of benefits" will be paid. On both factors,
Congress has already left to the states a great deal of discretion. King v.
Smith, supra. Thus, some states include in their "standard of need"
items that others do not take into account. Diversity also exists with
respect to the level of benefits in fact paid. Some states imposed a socalled dollar maximum on the amount of public assistance payable to any
one individual or family. Such maximums establish the upper limit
irrespective of how far short the limitation may fall from the theoretical
standard of need.17 Other states curtail the payment of benefits by a
system of "ratable reductions" whereby all recipients will receive a
fixed percentage of the standard of need.
18 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614; 54 Cal. Rev. 748.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 409 (1970). (N. 13; New York reported to
pay 100 per cent.)

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol3/iss1/7

8

Askew: Analysis of Cases Arising under the Public Assistance Titles of t
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
STATES

RECEIVING

FEDERAL

FUNDS

AND

STANDING

As long as a state is receiving federal funds, it is under a legal requirement to comply with the federal conditions placed on the receipt
of those funds; and individuals who are adversely affected by the failure
of the state to comply with the federal requirements in distributing those
funds are entitled to a judicial determination of such claim. King v.
Smith, supra.
All welfare recipients have standing to enforce the conditions of the

Social Security Act, Title IV, and any state law or regulation inconsistent
with such federal terms and conditions."8
LIENS

AND ASSIGNMENTS

Wyman,1

Snell v.
is a case of great significance because it sets out
that a welfare agency in the state of New York would not be in violation of the law if it placed a lien on the welfare recipient's ownership
in real property nor would it be in error or violation of the law if it
placed a lien on the potential or actual recoveries for personal injuries.
In addition, the welfare agency of our State can take an assignment of
the interest of an insured recipient in a life insurance policy. In the instant case, the court held that this would not be in violation of the law
because there was a statute which exempted wages and salaries from
repayment obligation. The statutes the plaintiffs attacked reached only
property already owned or to acquisitions, which have more or less the
character of "windfalls"-at least in the sense that such acquisitions do
not come from purposeful efforts to "attain or retain capability for selfsupport or self-care." 2 It was noted in this case that the federal statutes
said nothing about repayment, except to recognize and make provisions
for at least some form of recovery for some people who have received
assistance. In Donoho v. O'Connell's, Inc.,21 the court said that where
the statute does not provide comprehensively for a lien upon all potential
assets that might be or become available to a recipient, it is enough if
selection of subject for inclusion and exclusion is left upon a rational

basis. This view is also supported by the courts in Dandridge v. Williams, supra. In view of this fact, the court took the view that a state
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification had some
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'p393 U.S. 323 (1969).
20 42 U.S.C. §1351.
2d 432 (1960).
" 18 Ill.
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"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because
the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality. '2 2 The court stated clearly that
"a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."23
I think it is significant to note that the court said that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not give the federal court the power to impose upon
24
the states its views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.
STATES WITH

PROVISIONS FOR REPAYMENT

Thirty-two states say that they are in agreement with the Snell case
because they have adopted similar laws. The following cases were cited
which rejected constitutional attacks generally similar to those surmounted by the plaintiff in Snell: Lalic v. Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy R.R., 25 Noonan v. Child,2" Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp.,2
and see Characteristics of the State Public Assistance Plan under the
Social Security Act, 28 for reports from forty-four states.
DISCRIMINATORY STATUTES AND RELIEF FIRST SOUGHT

UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, dealt with welfare recipients' right
to receive assistance. The plaintiffs in this case had to wait one year
before they could receive aid from any welfare agency if they were
coming from another state or county. The court held that:
(1) Absent a compelling state interest, the Connecticut and Pennsylvania statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing a classification of welfare
applicants which impinged upon their constitutional right to travel
freely from state to state;
(2) Absent a compelling governmental interest, the district court of the
District of Columbia statutory provision violated the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment by imposing a discrimination
which impinged upon the constitutional right to travel;
Lindfley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
8
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
"See "Developments in the Equal Protection Law," 82 Harvard L. Rev. 1065,
1082-1087.
25263 F. Supp. 987 (1967).
20254 P.2d 1066 (1953).
196 N.E.2d 689 (1964).
8 Public Assistance Report No. 50, U.S. Department of Health, Education &
Welfare, 1964 Ed.
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(3)

Section 402(b) of the Society Security Act of 1935 did not,
and constitutionally could not, authorize the state to withhold
such one-year waiting period requirements.

In Damico v. California" the Supreme Court held that relief from
the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first
sought under state law which provided an administrative remedy. Also,
the California welfare laws were held to be unconstitutional because they
were discriminatory and were being administered in such a manner as
to deprive the plaintiff of his equal rights secured by the federal Constitution.
TERMINATION

BEFORE

HEARINGS

AND

BY

HOME VISITATIONS

In Goldberg v. Kell?' the plaintiff challenged the constitutional
adequacy of the New York City hearing procedures, alleging that such
procedures denied him due process. The Supreme Court of the United
States confirmed the district court holding. It stated that
(1) Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the welfare recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing
before termination of benefits by welfare authorities.
(2) New York procedures involving a post-termination hearing did
not meet such requirements, interest of an eligible recipient in
uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the state's
interest that his payments should not be erroneously terminated
outweighing the state's countervailing interest in conserving fiscal
and administrative resources.
(3) Although the approach of pre-termination hearings need not take
the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, or include a complete
record or comprehensive opinion, it was required to meet maximum
procedural safeguards demanded by rudimentary due process,
which included affording the recipients the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses relied upon by the welfare
department, to retain any attorney if he so desires, and to present
oral evidence to an impartial decisionmaker, whose conclusion
must rest solely on the legal rules of evidence adduced at the
hearing.
2389 U.S. 415 (1967).
80397

U.S. 254 (1970).
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Wyman v. James,"' is an interesting case that involves termination
of aid to welfare recipients who refused to permit welfare officials to
enter their homes. The court held that where the basic purpose of a
home visit is to ascertain actual residence, family composition, physical
well being of children, and giving help in management of home, such
could be equally achieved by means other than visits to the home.
Officials could obtain needed information from leases, birth certificates,
and periodic medical examinations. However, if officials felt search of
private property was necessary in particular cases, they could make
application for search warrants. On appeal, the appellee's motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and stay was denied
(probable jurisdicton was noted).
CONCLUSION

Dandridge v. Williams, supra, is one of the recent leading cases
regarding AFDC recipients. The United States Supreme Court revised
the District Court of Maryland decision and held that "maximum
grant" regulation was not inconsistent with the Social Security Act and
was not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The instant case
defines such terms as dependent child and eligibility. Before any AFDC
recipient can receive aid, he must fall within the meaning of these terms.
Also, in order for the court to settle any matter as between the recipient
or state, the court must have the proper jurisdiction (pendent or probable, etc.). Contrary to the holdings in Dandridge v. Williams, supra,
Rosado v. Wyman, supra, held that the New York statute by eliminating special needs grants, impermissibly lowered the state's standard
of need which was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and
Section 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs
were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition, the same
court in Wyman v. Rothstein, supra, held that a federal court called upon
to pass on constitutional validity of a state's welfare program should, before reaching the constitutional issue, consider first any pendent statutory
claims notwithstanding the pendency of negotiations between the state and
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The terminology of a
substituted-father or man in the house was pointed out in King v. Smith,
supra, and Lewis v. Martin, supra.
The courts will not allow a state regulation to prevail which denies
children (AFDC) payments, simply because the mother chooses to
81397 U.S. 904 (1969).
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"cohabitate" in or outside the home with any single or married man.
Nor will it allow a state statute to prevail if it precludes payments to
the child simply because a man is living with the spouse. In this type
of situation, there has to be actual proof of contribution. If such proof
cannot be found, then a denial would deprive the recipient of his rights
to receive aid. Welfare applicants are entitled to receive payments if
they meet the requirements set out in the Social Security Act. The state
cannot restrict the child nor the parent of this right by imposing oneyear waiting or resident requirements, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
and Wyman v. Bowens, supra. Generally, discrimination is not upheld by
the Supreme Court when a similar act to that of the above is alleged.
The United States Supreme Court in Damico v. Californa, supra, said
that it would also be discriminating if the court denied a welfare recipient
relief because he did not seek relief first under the state law. Recently,
there have been a few cases decided in the United States Supreme Court
regarding termination of welfare recipients' benefits. The majority of
the cases decided seem to hold that before terminating any recipients there
must be an evidentiary hearing before welfare authorities and that welfare officials should not terminate recipients if they refuse entry into
their homes without a search warrant. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, and
Wyman v. James, supra.
JOSEPH L. ASKEW

Civil Arrest in North Carolina
At common law, one's creditor had an absolute right to have him
arrested and imprisoned until his debt was paid.' Upon his arrest before
judgment, the debtor could give bail as an assurance of his appearance in
court. A failure to do so resulted in his confinement in jail until judgment
was rendered, and if he then failed to pay the debt, he was subject to body
execution-a fate which caused the debtor to be thrown in jail until the
debt was paid. More often than not the penniless debtor remained there
until his death as the creditor rarely intervened since a release of the judgment constituted a satisfaction of the judgment.2
In order to be rid of these harsh debtor laws, English immigrants
crossed the Atlantic and underwent other innumerable hardships. As a
14 Am. Jur., Arrest § 52 (1936).
'
-, Arrest and Imprisonment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 172 (1951).
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